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 T he Argentine Republic is experiencing a re-markable retreat of democracy. The extension and complexity of this retreat is diffi cult to un-derstand if using the theories of democracy 
that, with the collapse of the military dictatorships, have 
become the dominant analytical frameworks for left and 
progressive forces in the country and in Latin America. 
Contemporary democratization, understood as a social 
process of expansion of the forces of public appropriation, 
is comprised of three critical vectors: a techno-political 
vector, a techno-economic vector, and a techno-commu-
nicational vector. Each of them consists of a handful of 
dimensions. Here I would like to simply describe the key 
events that have been precipitating the structural retreat of 
democracy in Argentina in 2018. These events are associ-
ated with the political repressive dimension of the above-
mentioned political vector and with one of the paramount 
dimensions of the techno-economic vector for a peripheral 
>>
country: the degree of autonomy of the state to defi ne its 
macroeconomic policy.
  As regards the political repressive dimension, the two 
main events that reinforce each other are 1) the national 
executive power’s decision to establish, by decree, a doc-
trinal and functional transformation of the Armed Forces 
and 2) the support from the government itself to establish 
US military bases in different parts of the national territory. 
  Regarding the fi rst event, the pillar of the transforma-
tion that the executive power promotes with Decree N° 
683/2018 is the authorization for the Armed Forces to be 
able to perform homeland security tasks. With this, the bar-
rier between homeland security and national defense gets 
practically dissolved, which reinforces the government’s 
intention to criminalize the social protests that have been 
expanding throughout the country since the victory of Cam-
The new economic crisis has brought along 
new challenges for democracy in Argentina. 
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biemos (the ruling coalition) in December 2015. With this 
measure, Mauricio Macri’s government seeks to put the 
Armed Forces at the service of an “anti-drug traffi cking and 
anti-terrorist program” through which it fully aligns with the 
US foreign policy agenda. With the implementation of this 
new decree, Decree N° 1691/2006 is abolished, and the 
legal framework consisting of the National Defense Laws 
(1998), the Homeland Security Laws (1992) and the Na-
tional Intelligence Laws (2001) is meant to be fractured. 
These regulations, the result of three decades of demo-
cratic expansion, were built from multiparty consensuses 
unprecedented in their magnitude in national history.
   Regarding the second event, the government is promoting 
the establishment of US military bases on Argentinean land, 
whose technical direction is in the hands of the US South-
ern Command. Three locations have been identifi ed so far: 
the Triple Border (Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay), Tierra del 
Fuego (Ushuaia) and the province of Neuquén. Both events 
get reinforced by a third: the arrival of US troops on national 
territory this year, to carry out joint exercises with local forc-
es. As the authorities from both countries have declared, 
those exercises are being performed with the aim of offering 
information “against weapons of mass destruction traffi ck-
ing.” The arrival of foreign troops requires the authorization 
of the National Congress, but such an authorization has not 
been requested by the ruling party. 
   Along with these events, it is necessary to pay atten-
tion to a second series of events that has caused, in re-
cord time, the national state’s total loss of autonomy to 
formulate macroeconomic policies. I refer to the external 
hyper-indebtedness policy that Macri’s government has 
been displaying. The two key indicators here are the evo-
lution of the external debt vis-à-vis the GNP of Argentina 
and the characteristics of the commitments made with 
the creditors. As regards the former, it is possible to ob-
serve that Cambiemos has triggered the fastest growth of 
external debt in national history within the framework of 
a new regime of fi nancial value. Under Kirchner govern-
ments (2003-2015), state economic policies aimed to 
reduce external indebtedness through taking a hard line 
in negotiations with creditors. The relative success of such 
negotiations allowed for the promotion of the productive 
economy. To a great extent, it also allowed for the aban-
donment of the 1976-2001 model of fi nancial value. 
From December 2015 onwards, Macri’s government has 
returned to a compulsive external indebtedness as a key 
means to relaunch the system of fi nancial value. The ratio 
of external public debt to GNP has been increasing since 
2011, when it represented 14.2%, its lowest level since 
the restoration of democracy in 1983. From that moment 
onwards, the debt has started to grow, and has soared un-
der Macri’s accelerated hyper-indebtedness policies until 
reaching 65.5% of GNP in June 2018. Thus, the indebted-
ness coeffi cient in Argentina has gone from low to diffi cult-
to-manage levels in record time. The total issuance of debt 
in local and foreign currencies has reached the equivalent 
of almost USD 133 billion, which has turned the country 
into the biggest sovereign debt issuer among the emerging 
economies of the world for the period 2016-18.
   Regarding the relationship with creditors, the main event 
in this new cycle of indebtedness is the decision to rees-
tablish the subjection link with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) after fourteen years of having settled debts with 
that organization. The return to the IMF is materialized with 
the request of a standby loan. The novelty of this large loan 
(USD 50 billion) when compared with former standby loans 
signed by Argentina and the IMF is that not only tax and 
monetary targets but also infl ation will be supervised this 
time. In this way, Macri’s presidency practically delegates 
the management of the national economy to the IMF. In so 
doing, it becomes the executing hand of the monetaristic 
neoliberal adjustment program requested by the IMF. 
   The policies of homeland militarization and express hyper-
indebtedness are eroding national sovereignty and causing 
massive resistance and demonstrations throughout the 
national territory. The opposition forces involve a broad 
spectrum of social actors that are damaged or excluded 
from society by this regressive social transformation. Al-
though the relationship of power between the advocates 
of democratization and the advocates of the new regime 
of globalized private macro-appropriation is remarkably un-
equal in favor of the latter, the national political future in 
the medium term is unpredictable. It is necessary to bear 
in mind that it is not enough to simply describe the cur-
rent process of democratic erosion. The point is to explain 
the phenomenon from a multidimensional perspective of 
democracy subsumed into a new social theory of appro-
priation and sociohistorical change. Such an explanatory 
device will allow us to redefi ne a new left program of social 
change that addresses the social game of appropriation 
into which we are immersed. We will have to achieve it 
before it is too late for democracy. 
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